The influence of the imbalance of powers on the efficiency of the judicial system in Ecuador

Abstract

The Ecuadorian judicial system has undergone significant transformations since the return to democracy in 1979. Although the 1998 Constitution established a formal structure of separation of powers, studies have indicated that in practice there is an excessive concentration of power in the executive branch, which has affected the autonomy of the judiciary. This article analyzes in depth the causes and consequences of this power imbalance in Ecuador and proposes recommendations to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of the judicial system. It examines how the concentration of power in the executive has affected the ability of the judiciary to perform its functions impartially and autonomously, paying special attention to mechanisms of political interference, budgetary resource allocation, and the erosion of checks and balances. The methodology employed included an exhaustive documentary analysis, the use of semi-structured interviews and focus groups, as well as case studies. The results reveal patterns of concentration of power in the executive, weakening of accountability mechanisms, deterioration of judicial efficiency, and loss of legitimacy of the judiciary. Based on these findings, concrete recommendations are formulated to restore an adequate balance of powers, through institutional reforms, improved resource allocation, and strengthening of judicial independence. These proposals seek to guarantee the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary as a fundamental pillar of Ecuadorian democracy.

Keywords: Ecuadorian judicial system, Democracy, Constitution.