Logical uncertainty in the judicial process and its relationship with the presumption of innocence

Abstract

The study aimed to analyze the application of dissenting votes and reasonable doubt in judicial processes, evaluating their implications for the presumption of innocence. A qualitative methodology was used, combining descriptive, deductive, and historical-logical methods, and statistical data were collected from the Council of the Judiciary of Santo Domingo. Interviews with local judges were also conducted to gather their opinions on these concepts. The results revealed that dissenting votes are applied when a judge disagrees with the majority decision of the court and may be based on reasonable doubt or insufficient evidence. This mechanism allows for the ratification of the defendant's innocence if the evidence is inconclusive. Several cases were highlighted where the dissenting vote was fundamental, although the final court decision did not always reflect the consensus of all judges. The main conclusions indicated that reasonable doubt and dissenting votes are essential to ensuring justice and fairness in judicial processes. These mechanisms allow judges to express their personal convictions and ensure that decisions are based on solid evidence and rigorous analysis. The research highlights the need for in-depth debate in the judicial deliberation process, ensuring that decisions reflect procedural truth and respect the presumption of innocence. This investigation provides a detailed understanding of how reasonable doubt and dissenting votes operate within the judicial system, emphasizing their importance for the administration of justice in Ecuador.

Keywords:

Criminal process, Citizen tribunal, Dissenting vote, Judicial practice.