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NATURAL

HUMAN ATTITUDE TO INTEGRATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

ACTITUD HUMANA NATURAL ANTE LA INTEGRACIÓN DE LA INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL

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ABSTRACT

This study aims to explore the interaction between humans and artificial intelligence (AI) by examining the concept of human artificiality. It seeks to understand how AI can be naturalized within human experience and consciousness, thereby facilitating a trustful and productive relationship between humans and AI. The research employs a qualitative philosophical analysis grounded in the traditions of thinkers such as Plato, Spengler, Heidegger, and Levi-Strauss. Data collection involves a comprehensive literature review of philosophical texts and contemporary research on AI. The analysis reveals that AI, as a form of human-made artificiality, can be understood through the same philosophical principles that govern human artificiality. The study identifies a multi-layered structure of intelligence and highlights the historical continuity in human interaction with artificial systems. It also uncovers the risks of de-naturalization and mechanization of humans if AI is not appropriately integrated into human life. The relevance of the research is determined by the practical task of artificial intelligence naturalization by contemporary man, by the need to develop practical forms of constructive and productive mutual understanding. The solution of this practical task can serve to prevent the danger of de-naturalization and robotization of man.

Keywords: Artificial and Natural, Naturalization of Artificial, Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness, Individuality.

RESUMEN

Este estudio tiene como objetivo explorar la interacción entre los seres humanos y la inteligencia artificial (IA) mediante el examen del concepto de artificialidad humana. Busca comprender cómo la IA puede naturalizarse dentro de la experiencia y la conciencia humanas, facilitando así una relación confiable y productiva entre los seres humanos y la IA. La investigación emplea un análisis filosófico cualitativo basado en las tradiciones de pensadores como Platón, Spengler, Heidegger y Lévi-Strauss. La recopilación de datos implica una revisión bibliográfica exhaustiva de textos filosóficos e investigaciones contemporáneas sobre la IA. El análisis revela que la IA, como una forma de artificialidad creada por el hombre, puede entenderse a través de los mismos principios filosóficos que rigen la artificialidad humana. El estudio identifica una estructura de inteligencia de múltiples capas y destaca la continuidad histórica en la interacción humana con los sistemas artificiales. También descubre los riesgos de desnaturalización y mecanización de los seres humanos si la IA no se integra adecuadamente en la vida humana. La relevancia de la investigación está determinada por la tarea práctica de la naturalización de la inteligencia artificial por parte del hombre contemporáneo, por la necesidad de desarrollar formas prácticas de entendimiento mutuo constructivo y productivo. La solución de

este problema práctico puede servir para prevenir el peligro de desnaturalización y robotización del hombre.

Palabras clave: Artificial y natural, Naturalización de lo artificial, Inteligencia artificial, Conciencia, Individualidad.

INTRODUCTION

In one of his interviews, Elon Musk said that the unrestrained development of artificial intelligence (AI) could lead humanity to consequences far exceeding the negative impact, for example, nuclear war. We hardly have the right to ignore forecasts of this kind. Artificial intelligence is constantly and exponentially ahead of human intelligence.

There is even reason to believe that currently, the (self) development of AI is at the stage of getting out of control of any social and human being. No doubt, any technical means might get out of human control one day. And artificial intelligence is no exception (Miller et al., 2022; Dazeley et al., 2021; Gunning et al., 2019)

We should make some preliminary remarks to clarify our positions. Firstly, it concerns the authors' understanding of what philosophy is. From our point of view, philosophy, originally being a theoretical subject, is not identical to science and does not exhaust itself in epistemological paradigmatic.

Its conscious connection with language suggests the need to include in the philosophical analysis the factor of the linguization of consciousness, which, by the way, manifests the artificial (transformed) nature of the latter. Philosophy is a form of thought that grasps the gaps in its understanding that naturally arise if the subject is treated via a scientific approach, allowing (the form) to keep the subject in the mind of the researcher with a certain integrity. It is scientific, but it is not a science. Secondly, we deliberately take out of the scope of this work the discussion about the peculiarities of different ways of understanding AI. It exceeds our subject limits.

What we wanted to do was focus on the question regarding the existence of artificial intelligence in the environment that generates it, the question of the relation between artificial intelligence as a virtual reality and the reality that generates it, which is ontologically primary (note: we provide the term "virtual" as an illustration, an example, and not as our own tool of work). The present work will not contain anything fundamentally new. We offer just a slight change in optics. However, it is necessary to return to certain somewhat forgotten provisions just to clarify the problem of artificial intelligence.

Shifting the problem of artificial intelligence into the field of analyzing the artificiality of human nature itself, we propose to look at the situation not as something new that requires an innovative solution, but as one of the variations of a fairly traditional problem in philosophy: the problems of human artificiality and artificial artificiality (artificial to the degree of n), which all result from the man´s activities.

In this article, we would like to draw attention to the ideas of W.R. Ashby, a thinker who became one of the first in the creation and research of artificial intelligence. In the last sentence of "Introduction to Cybernetics" he wrote:

Since we know that the ability to choose can be enhanced, it seems to follow that the power of the intellect, like the power of the physical, can be enhanced. ... developing, the brain becomes a more perfect organ than is possible with the direct determination of all its details by a set of genes. What is new here is the idea that we can do it synthetically, consciously, intentionally (Ashby, 1956, p. 83).

Therefore, there arises a question – what we will do with our brain ourselves – synthetically, consciously, intentionally – is it artificial or natural? Initially, of course, it is artificial, being the result of our special efforts, but "at the second step of creation" – we just get used to these efforts, and our "advanced" state of the brain will become natural for us. There will be a naturalization of the artificial... in man. One of the creators of cybernetics understood this.

By making such a shift, we provoke a certain parallax effect, which allows us to see the ways to solve new problems in traditional philosophical approaches. What we are going to do is discuss how philosophy treated the issue of human interaction with some technical and technological inventions (writing, writing tools, and technology as such), there were ways of interacting with artificial systems that gradually reached the level of autopoietic development.

DEVELOPMENT

The research base for this approach is the entire philosophical tradition from Plato to Spengler, Heidegger, and Levi-Strauss. Having thus outlined the area of our research and the tasks set we have already named some methodological keys to be used. They include the principle of consistency, the principle of parallax shift and the corresponding parallax vision, the principle of deconstruction, the principle of symphonism, and the idea of autopoiesis, which, in turn, do not contradict the classical methods of dialectics. First of all, it is the principle of consistency, which allows us to see the multilevel meanings of the concept of "intelligence".

The methodology of philosophy in the contemporary context can, in our opinion, be defined as a "movement on the object" (the definition was borrowed from Kemerov, 1998): "Movement on the object, presented as a change of points of view on the object (italics were used by the author, but might well be ours! – N.T., T.S.) in a certain connection and sequence, can be interpreted as an approximation, relatively speaking:

to the point of view of the object itself, or as a transition from the position of the subject's non-occurrence to the position of the object. The condition for such an approximation is to take into account the difference between the generally significant form of representation of the object and the social form of its development, as well as the difference between the latter and the form of the identity of its being (Kemerov, 1998, p. 63).

We find a similar position in the "Thick Description" by Geertz (1973), which states that while building a certain discourse capable of describing the position under scrutiny, a theorist stumbles upon a mixture of essential points of view, similar to the real life when we encounter a mixture of languages.

The researcher is searching for the same "common language". Its purpose is "*to expand the boundaries of human discourse"* (p. 182). And further: *"*the task of the theory is to provide vocabulary that would help to express what a symbolic action implies, i.e., the role of culture in human life*"* (Geertz, 1973, p. 196). In our case, this is a conceptual reservoir that allows us to discuss the phenomenon under scrutiny from different positions, without fitting them into each other as dense as possible in the mosaic canvas. At the same time, to obtain a stereoscopic, and not only a planar vision of the object, units of this "stock" must have a "minimum level of compliance" (Geertz, 1973, p. 186). This is a collage, but for its formation, you need some canvas, a methodological canvas that will allow us to keep the subject in sight.

The peculiarities of the interaction between the artificial and the natural in human reality seem to be quite a complex process, which is described in the categories of the dialectics of naturalization and de-naturalization. Regarding the problem of this article, the description of this process implies recognition of the fact that there is no identity between human consciousness and intelligence.

About the artificiality of the natural

The concept of "intelligence" reveals a multi-layered structure and multi-meaningfulness. It is studied by psychology, philosophy, pedagogy, cognitive science, computer science, etc. And each subject contributes to increasing confusion in the understanding of intelligence. Nevertheless, all interpretations agree that intelligence is related to the ability to adapt to the environment, but the very concept of adaptation again multiplies meanings that coincide in one point: this ability does not necessarily have to be reflected and generally understood. Therefore, intelligence is not a concept synonymous with consciousness. This non-synonymy of concepts is often simply ignored while discussing the problem. Hence the imaginary tragic tension of the discussion about artificial intelligence is: will AI encroach on human rights as an intelligent being? It seems that behind this question the proper philosophical tensions regarding the problem disappear.

Arguments to refute the thesis that "superintelligence" can replace not only consciousness but even the human mind can be the views of the philosopher Spinoza (1994), and the contemporary neuroscience specialist A. Damasio, who insist that the human brain and body only jointly produce the mind.

Spinoza (1994), as the first philosopher of the symbiosis of body and immanence, wrote: *"*Thinking substance and extended substance constitute one and the same substance, understood in one case by one attribute, in the other by another*"* (p. 97). Mind and body are in a relationship not of unity but of fusion.

Damasio continues Spinoza's thoughts and concludes that the body needs to return to the dominant role in the production of mental ideas based on homeostasis. Homeostasis is the general will to remain in being, to maintain internal unity, evolutionarily leading to effects, and finally via mind to consciousness. Damassio (2017), believes that feelings, and affects, which constitute the middle of the homeostatic process, are the only things capable of producing meaning. Therefore, AI is unable to learn the concept of purpose: to express intentionality, one must have a body.

The problem of the ratio between the artificial and the natural has a long tradition in philosophy and there are several ways of its understanding (not solutions, of course). You can start with ancient philosophy, guide it through the idea of the creation of man by God, and find different justifications in European philosophical discourse (Hegelianism, Marxism, ... the list may continue). Traditionally, the "artificial" is represented by what is created by man, whose nature is terminologically defined by the concept of nature. This understanding goes back to the ancient philosophy, of Plato and Aristotle, and assumes the understanding of the natural as having arisen by nature, by itself, and the artificial as being determined by another being in its origin. The artificial is supposed to be a form of transformation,

according to the birth of another order, non-natural in its essence. If putting the issue this way, there arises a premise to assume ontological duality, the parallelism of natural and artificial, which, by the way, leads to an understanding of their relationship as some kind of original conflict. In the book "The Natural and the Artificial: Struggle of the Worlds" Kutyrev (2014), claims:

in the XX century, two realities took shape on earth, "two worlds" – the natural world and the artificial world. On the one hand, there is everything that can exist without a person, which grows and was once born, on the other hand, there is everything that man created, that keeps working and being invented, has acquired unprecedented significance and its own laws of development. The artificial has become independent and its relationship with the natural determines the essence of any serious problem today. (p. 5).

However, philosophy knows another way of understanding the relationship between the natural and the artificial, which we propose to take as a basis. This way of naturalizing the artificial can be found in the Aristotelian understanding of political feeling (a natural feeling possessed by a free person, a political creature, but which can only be realized in the form of deployment in learning). The continuation of this understanding is found in the concept of the second nature proposed by Marx, which (nature) arises as a reflection of the mediated nature of human activity (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 27). When applying this approach, there arises a different, monistic way of understanding man as an artificial being by nature. The naturalness, nature, turns out to be initially reconstructed, artificial, and consequently naturalized. At the same time, it is worth noting that such an understanding goes beyond the Marxist approach. Thus, in philosophical anthropology, the law of natural artificiality formulated by Plessner (2004), which assumes the development of a certain form by trespassing its limits, is widely used. Mind, that Plessner also put forward the law of mediated immediacy.

With this approach, artificiality is revealed as a new natural state that has arisen on the horizon of action, and transformation and requires for its maintenance a certain effort of the already natural order. Thus, Mamardashvili (2019), states:

Human institutions ... do not live in the same way as natural objects do, in the sense that they do not last by themselves — it is impossible to create an institution and assume that it will live by itself. It will live itself only to the extent that it is renewed by a human effort aimed at ensuring that this institution exists (pp. 23-24).

In other words, "to create an artificial world is an immanent property of a person as a generic being" (Erofeeva, 2002, p. 43).

Thus, human intelligence is an artificial phenomenon (in the format of naturalization, and mediation), and if we are talking about artificial intelligence, then we are talking about something artificiality squared. Human intelligence is cultivated intelligence, always artificially (previously) created by the man himself, it is never given ready once and for all, it is by definition artificial. However, a person turns any stage of his development into a normal daily recurring phenomenon. The artificial becomes natural for him.

There is another illusion, which is difficult to overcome even theoretically, if you do not set yourself the task of keeping this thought within the horizon of your reasoning. Mamardashvili (1990), called it "a common habit of thinking", which none of the theorists is deprived of. It is connected with the fact that "we, as a rule, inscribe acts of consciousness within the boundaries of the anatomical outline of a person. But, perhaps, essentially, in some primary way, consciousness is placed outside the individual and represents some kind of space-like or field formation" (p. 73). Of course, we must remember that consciousness and intelligence are not synonymous, but a simplified understanding of consciousness leads to misunderstandings, according to which some phenomenon, irreducible to individual physicality, a priori begins to be opposed to human, understood also as squeezed into the "anatomical outlines of a person". Although we are within the phenomenon of anthropological presence, in the cultural field, artificial intelligence in this regard does not fall into another space, but requires analysis of this special artificiality.

AI is still artificial, that is, not yet included in the natural framework. This artificiality to the degree of N sets both advantages and limitations on AI: it cannot become an intellectual being, it cannot be a person, an individual.

The habit of thinking via bodies and objects leads to a rigid distinction between objective and subjective, forming the idea of some objective knowledge, which, allegedly, is the ultimate goal of cognition and should be deprived of any presence of human subjectivity. Against this background, one loses faith in their cognitive abilities: they are seen as redundant if there is an AI nearby. The metaphysics of the cognitive process which consists primarily of the fact that the cognizing person (or the community of cognizing people) knows that he does not know, disappears. This "knowledge of the unknown" is a necessary human component of the cognition process (Tereshchenko, 2011, p. 315). While for artificial intelligence such knowledge is abundant and non-productive, for a human being it is important because in the sphere of the unknown, there opens up a new perspective, both of knowledge and life in general (Veliev, 2024; Coleman, 2020; Luzan & Kurki, 2020).

Thus, the problem today is not that of continuing fear of expecting the machines´ uprising as an uprising of artificial intelligence, but, as it always is, that of conversation and confident communication between human beings with their consciousness as well as the expansion of their presence in the world (Echarte, 2023, Avila, 2021).

Regarding the danger of spontaneous naturalization: human de-naturalization.

This conversation between human beings and their consciousness must evolve lading to the development of AI, but leading astray from human development. In other words, if a person rushes into trying to keep up with AI or tries to copy it, they can face a problem of their machine-likening. There are so many social mechanisms in mass society that fit a person and their consciousness into a certain (society) automatism, mechanism. Human mechanization is underway.

The claim that this process began quite a long ago, in the times when large-scale machine production began, and the man became an appendage of the machine, a semi-worker and sort of a cog in the production system. The production did not need all people, just some of their powers and abilities. Therefore, the human appendage of the machine was typified as much as possible. The machine ground out people. And yet, in this cog´s "economy", there remained some minimal space that was not captured by the processes of mechanization. Now let us think of some perspective analogy or an analogous perspective. The human being becomes an "appendage" of artificial intelligence. And how can it be otherwise? In many ways, AI (quantitative!) has long surpassed the human being. What is more, it is impossible to stop its improvement process, as it is impossible concerning any progress. And, of course, there is a possibility that artificial intelligence will get out of human control. This possibility exists almost always when a person uses any means of labor: an axe can fall on their foot, a car can get out of control, etc. Moreover, the more complex the technical devices, the more serious and irreversible the consequences of their "uprising" may be. However, this obvious fact did not stop scientific and technological progress, not for a minute.

AI and consciousness are different things, but sometimes a person is ready to give the machine not only the tasks of storing or quickly searching for information but also other components of consciousness. If we understand consciousness traditionally, we, to put it another way, at the level of naturalistic prejudice (what is in the head), then there is a feeling of ontic equality of this consciousness and artificial intelligence. So, there arises, for example, the illusion that I know something if I just have some information in my computer memory.

AI is individual, but it is not individual, because it is rather quantitative than qualitative. What does it mean? A bright human individual can only develop in contact and interaction with other people, and even loneliness is no more than an expression of need for other people. AI cannot be alone. It does not need anybody else: neither a human nor another AI. But this is its problem, not a human problem. For a person, the problem is not to cease to need human relations in all their variety, and not to become similar to an individual technical system. And they will still have to naturalize AI. Naturally, some people will be able to do it faster and easier, others – harder and slower. Just like a car, someone learns to drive very quickly, but for someone, it is a difficult task. Finally, some people will never learn how to do it. But it doesn't matter: a person as a generic being already knows how to drive a car. Where does this analogy lead us? The human being, as a generic being, is quite capable of appropriating AI, making it their artificial, but natural organ, "artificial human intelligence".

The task (including the theorists one) is that of endeavoring to overcome the "everyday habit of thinking". The act of consciousness beyond the anatomical outlines of a person is the consciousness of a person as a generic being. It is this joint human consciousness that can naturalize artificial intelligence.

Regarding the conditions for making, it possible to naturalize AI

What are the conditions, that can allow to implementation of such a possibility? Let us appeal to historical and cultural analogies. One of them is the emergence of writing and, most importantly, humanity's awareness of the consequences of this invention.

"When it came to writing, Teut said: "This science, this king, will make the Egyptians wiser and more mindful, as we have found a means of keeping memory and wisdom". The king said:

> Highly ingenious Teut, one can generate objects of art, and the other can judge about the fraction of harm or benefit they have for those who will use them. And now you, the father of letters, because of love for them, have given them an exactly opposite meaning. They will instill forgetfulness in the souls of those who know them since memory will be deprived of exercise: they will remember from the outside, trusting the written letters, and extraneous signs, and not from the inside, by themselves. Therefore, you have found a means not for memory, but for recalling. You give your students fictitious, not authentic wisdom. They will know a lot by hearsay, without training, and will seem knowledgeable, remaining mostly ignorant, people difficult to communicate with; they will seem to be wise instead of being wise. (Plato, 1993, p. 186).

This fragment from "Phaedrus" often attracts the attention of thinkers belonging to different spheres and different ideologies concerning the technologization of the human mind. It predominantly claims that any invention is ambivalent and carries not only positive aspects but is also

fraught with greater or lesser losses. This is certainly the case. But let us consider another point. It was pronounced (it was "pronounced" since he did not confine himself to it) by Eco (1996), in a lecture delivered in Moscow: "The Pharaoh seemed to point first at the writing, and then at the ideal symbol of human memory and said: "This (i.e., writing) will kill that (i.e., memory)". In "Notre Dame de Paris" Hugo Claude Frollo points first at the book (books had just begun to be printed at that time), then at his cathedral and says: "This will kill that". That is, he also loops the situation, seeing its repetition in the invention of printing. And this is not news, let us be honest. But! Let us allow ourselves to say "but!".

There is something really important, Eco (1996), wrote:

the perfect symbol of human memory"! Let us emphasize the first word, not the second. So, the trick is that this symbol is perfect. A person creates new means of supporting the mind, thinking that they are approaching the ideal. But in fact, what they create is a certain system of technical means, perhaps an ideal one of the sorts (with the help of the alphabet, it is really possible to create an infinite number of texts), but at the same time it loses the power of ideality: the power of the ideal is in its inaccessibility. And in our case, this implies understanding the non-absolute value of any achievement.

While the ideal system is improving in its own way, the mind will discover its other hypostasis, which is not subject to the ideality of this system and, as a goal, puts, the system, in a dead end. While the system goes from perfection to even greater perfection, turning the previous stage into imperfection, the human mind goes from imperfection to discovering different channels of communication with perfection. Through forgetfulness, slowness of reading and writing, lack of inclusiveness, inability to contain colossal amounts of knowledge, etc. the mind goes towards refinement, paradoxicity, stereoscopy, the ability to moderate its ambitions, to pacify its self-will, which demonstrates the maturity, but a priori cannot be inherent in AI, since its quantitative nature requires a different approach to itself (assuming that AI can relate to itself). If we cannot assume this return relation (perhaps it is present in the autopoietic idea of self-learning systems), then even more so AI does not go beyond the limits of the possibility of natural reason.

But there is another nuance in Plato´s text itself. "Highly ingenious Teut, one can generate objects of art, another one can judge what proportion of harm or benefit there is in them for those who will use them", says Pharaoh, thus dividing not only people performing different tasks but also the telos preceding the solution of these tasks. Now we could say: that creativity in a specific area and its social expertise are carried out not from the point of view of this particular area, but from a broader horizon, in the horizon of integrity, and totality.

Burlatsky considered a vivid and well-known example of such an expertise, at the same time being a self-expertise, the works, created by Leonardo da Vinci. He even uses the term "Leonardo's morality" (Burlatsky, 1989, pp. 98-99). Leonardo had an idea of creating a submarine, which he hid from his contemporaries, believing that this invention was dangerous for the still too young and imperfect, "childish" humanity. Of course, this is a radical form of self-examination, probably there are other ways possible. Anthropological expertise is now widely applied to the problems of ecology and urban planning, as well as that of space research. Perhaps it might be of use to develop expert assessments regarding the anthropological proportionality of AI. Nowadays, such expertise is certainly not demanded.

However, the lack of demand for this expertise does not mean that it is not necessary. Rather, the contemporary public consciousness lacks the motive for being aware of the need for such expertise. Moreover, as is normally the case, certain assumptions in this respect can be found in literary texts, but technically and technologically of thinking, such an aspect is nonexistent. Meanwhile, a truly human, anthropologically verified attitude and constructive interaction between people and a new artifact presupposes its diverse, polyphonic involvement in the ensemble of social relations. The interaction between man and AI, by the polyphonic and symphonic nature of man, is also a system of increased complexity, and it seems at least short-sighted to ignore the symphonism of the relationships in human existence.

The appeal to the principle of symphonism as a research model (let us call it principal a) corresponding to the symphonic nature of the human community (let us call it principal b) is not a new idea.

Levi-Strauss (1958), in his "Structural Anthropology" spoke about the myth:

We will consider (see principal b – N.T., T.S.) the myth as if it were an orchestral score rewritten by an ignorant amateur, line by line, in the form of a continuous melodic sequence; what we are trying to do is restore its original arrangement (see: principal a – N.T., T.S.) (p. 222).

Indeed, a linearly recorded myth appears before us in a distorted, non-natural (but not in its own, actually artificial!) form. Its inner rhythms, having strayed, cease to pulsate like the rhythms of a myth. So, for example, the pool-like

time of the myth will not stretch into a line, and if it is stretched, there appear contradictions that break the entire structure of the myth. Levi-Strauss turned to the principle of symphonism as a research matrix when working with artificial formations, which include almost all cultural and social processes. His work "Mythologics" is written in the form of a full score: an Overture. A theme with variations. A sonata of good manners. A fugue of the five senses, etc. – it is enough to look at the structure of the content (Levi-Strauss, 1983). The reason is clear: music dealing with musical sound as an artificial formation (let us leave aside the experiments with the decomposition of musical sound, conducted in the twentieth century) develops by fully objective laws that have a compositional nature. Considering artificial intelligence in such a symphonic, compositional paradigm might help to see new aspects of its interaction with other, also artificial, social phenomena, to get away from excessive demonization of AI and moderate the alarmist moods of its opponents.

CONCLUSIONS

So, the present article offers to shift the focus of artificial intelligence research to the field of system analysis of society as the AI collective subject. The connection between AI and consciousness considered above, packed into anthropological boundaries of the individual human body, leads to a distortion in understanding both the current state of the problem and the search for ways to harmonize, as soon as possible, the relations between AI and the generic man.

An attempt to place the problem into a different, unusual context, to play it "through the theater of philosophy", using all the philosophical baggage for its comprehension, will, as we have already said, reduce the degree of alarmism, expand the theoretical base of analysis and add a bit of healthy skepticism and irony to the arguments about the infinite superiority of artificial intelligence over human capabilities.

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